Book
Oxford Handbook of Market Design, edited by Z. Neeman, A. Roth, and N. Vulkan, Oxford University Press (2013).
Working Papers
- "How Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior," with Penélope Hernández.
- "Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy," with Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav and Luigi Pascali.
- "The Microfinance Disappointment: An Explanation based on Risk Aversion in a Convex Framework," with Alexey Khazanov, Omer Moav and Hosny Zoabi.
- "Government Financing of R&D: a Mechanism Design Approach," with Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman.
- "The Benefit of Collective Reputation," with Aniko Ӧry and Jungju Yu.
- "Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests," with Yigal Attali and Analia Schlosser.
- "Communication and Deception in 2-Player Games," with Benjamin Bachi and Sambuddha Ghosh.
- “Are Career Women Good for Marriage?” with Andy Newman and Claudia Olivetti.
- "Linearity and the Doctrinal Paradox," with Eyal Baharad.
Publications (in Reverse Chronological Order)
- "The Reliance Requirement in Consumer Fraud and Misrepresentation," with Alon Klement and Yuval Procaccia, forthcoming International Review of Law and Economics.
- "Geography, Transparency and Institutions," with Yoram Mayshar and Omer Moav, American Political Science Review (2017), 1-15. DOI:10.1017/S0003055417000132.
- "Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach," with Alma Cohen and Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies 44 (2015), S133-S159.
- "Personality Traits and Strategic Behavior: an Experimental Study," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Journal of Economic Psychology, 42 (2014) 136-147.
- "Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartiality," with Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies, to appear.
- "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," with Gregory Pavlov, Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 473-501.
- "Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital," with Omer Moav, Economic Journal 122 (2012), 933-956.
- "Status and Poverty," with Omer Moav, Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010), 413-420.
- “The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort,” with Omer Moav, Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (2010), 642-660.
- “Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics,” with Lucian Bebchuk, Review of Financial Studies 23 (2010), 1089-1119.
- “Markets Versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets,” with Nir Vulkan, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (2010) : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 6. DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1554
- "Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations," with Vincent Crawford, Tamar Kugler, and Ady Pauzner, Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009), 377-387.
- “Corruption and Openness,” with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon, B.E. Journal in Economic Analysis & Policy 8 (2008), Vol 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions) Article 50.
- “The Robustness of Scoring Rules Against Inefficient Manipulation,” with Eyal Baharad, Social Choice & Welfare 29 (2007), 55-67.
- “On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests,” with Gerhard Orosel, International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006), 536-556.
- “On the (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,” with Aviad Heifetz, Econometrica 74 (2006), 213-233.
- “Markets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Analysis," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006), 121-134.
- “Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (2005), 285-314.
- “The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design,” Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 55-77.
- “Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2004), 102-124.
- “Contestable Licensing,” with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art1.
- “The Effectiveness of English Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2003), 214-238.
- “Optimal Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities,” with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43 (2002), 303-324.
- “Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Majority and Borda rules,” with Eyal Baharad, Review of Economic Design 7 (2002), 331-340.
- “Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis,” with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art6.
- “A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization,” with Leonard Wantchekon, Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (2002), 439-464.
- “The Scope of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,” with Ehud Lehrer, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000), 309-326.
- “Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,” with Enriqueta Aragones, Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (2000), 183-204.
- “Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999), 679-691.
- “The Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1999), 685-703.
- “Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids,” with Gerhard Orosel, Journal of Economic Theory 85 (1999), 91-121.
- “Termination and Coordination in Partnerships,” with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8 (1999), 191-221.
- “Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,” Games and Economic Behavior 16 (1996), 77-96.
- “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior 12 (1996), 162-164.
- “On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,” Mathematical Social Sciences 29 (1995), 195-212.
Other Papers
- "A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems," with Alon Klement, to appear in the Oxford Handbook of Market Design, Oxford University Press (2013).
- "Markets vs. Negotiations: 3 case studies," with Nir Vulkan, to appear in the Oxford Handbook of Market Design, Oxford University Press (2013).
- “Mechanism Design,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, (2008) edited by William A. Darity, Jr. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA.
- “Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 164 (2008), 52-67.
- "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure: Comment," with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 164 (2008), 130-133.